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AlHow Long Is Life? Neoliberalism
and Islamic Piety
Humeira Iqtidar“My brother thinks counting his sins . . . turning his back on politics is
what Islam is all about. . . . It is certainly an easier route to salvation!”Abdul
Basit said slightly sarcastically as his older brother, Abdul Baqir, sat with his
head bowed and a slight smile on his face.1 Both Abdul Baqir and Abdul
Basit were united in their conviction that leading an Islamic life was impor-
tant. But for them to agree on an interpretation of the good Muslim life,
however, was not as easy. The two had chosen different paths: one brother
was a member of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and vociferous about the impor-
tance of state-oriented political struggle as an integral part of religious life.
The other had joined the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ), a pietist, almost vehemently
apolitical group, after an initial brief link with the JI. The clamor of argu-
ments about Islamism and its potential conﬂict with liberalism, modernity,
and democracy have drowned out other conversations. This essay is an at-
tempt at tuning in to a more muted but no less transformative harmony
between one particular strand of Islamic thought and practice—mass Is-
lamic pietism—and neoliberalism by focusing on the ideational constella-
tions supported by the pietist, mass proselytizing group, Tablighi Jamaat,
which is the largest organized grouping of Muslims in the world today. To
evaluate the exact numbers of those afﬁliated with the group is hard givenCritical Inquiry 43 (Summer 2017)
© 2017 by The University of Chicago. 00093-1896/17/4304-0003$10.00. All rights reserved.
1. The names in this essay are pseudonyms in accordance with standard anthropological
norms. I am grateful to Saba Mahmood, Robin Douglass, John Dunn, Leigh Jenco, Joshua Si-
mon, Adrian Blau, Adam Tebble, Gregory Starett, Kamran Asdar Ali, Elena Zillioti, and the
anonymous reviewers for generous and incisive feedback on earlier versions of this essay. The
essay was presented at conferences and seminars at SOAS, King’s College London, and Cam-
bridge University. I am grateful for the questions and comments raised by the audiences. Un-
less otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
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Althe organization’s reticence, but a reliable estimate ranges from twelve to
eightymillion in 150 countries of the world.2More importantly, both schol-
ars3 and European and North American policymakers4 see the TJ as pro-
moting a version of piety that does not interfere with secularism and thus
as preferable to the aggressively political stance of the Islamists. I am not
interested here in rehashing concerns about secularism and jihadism, pri-
vate religiousity versus public religious expression, but to argue for closer
attention to the ongoing transformations of contemporary Islamic political
thought with relation to broader structural and global ideational changes.
As I shall explain below, the TJ predates neoliberalism, but the argument is
not for a causal relationship. Rather, the unexpected coming together of
strands of Islamic political thought and practice in a mass proselytizing
movement with neoliberalism have given signiﬁcant traction to neoliberal
sensibilities. The question is not of Islamic piety in general but of a very
speciﬁc kind of mass pietism. Critically, the relationship between TJ and
neoliberalism remains far from seamless, and a key area of friction is the
difference in their conceptions of time, which I shall discuss at the end.
Critics of economic liberalization of the last four decades, under the
rubric of neoliberalism, have highlighted its imposition under false pre-2. See Pew Research on Muslim Networks in Europe, “Tablighi Jama'at,” www.pewforum
.org/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-tablighi-jamaat/. TJ an-
nual meetings in Pakistan and Bangladesh bring together close to two to three million people,
about the same number as the mandatory pilgrimage to Mecca for all practicing Muslims.
3. See Yoginder Sikand, The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jama'at (1920–2000):
A Cross-Country Comparative Study (New Delhi, 2002), and Paul Heck, “Knowledge,” in Islamic
Political Thought, ed. Gerhard Bowering (Princeton, N.J., 2015), p. 10 contend that TJ is com-
patible with and may even promote secularism because the movement’s disinterest in this-
worldly affairs is largely compatible with it. Their main concern is about the foregrounding
of a Muslim identity that the TJ supports and its possible implicit support for jihadist activi-
ties.
4. See the Pew Forum, “Tablighi Jama'at,” which records that TJ members in Europe
number close to 150,000 and in many European cities have worked closely with city authori-
ties. Such numbers in any other Islamic organization would provoke extreme anxiety, but
because authorities see the TJ as promoting primarily individual, privatized piety it is consid-
ered relatively benign. In recent years, some concerns about TJ indirectly supporting jihadism
among Muslims have surfaced; see, for instance, Alex Alexiev, “Tablighi Jama'at: Jihad’s
Stealthy Legions,” Middle East Quarterly 12 (Winter 2005): 3–11. But these concerns have not
made a signiﬁcant impact on TJ’s presence in the North Atlantic world.
Humeira Iqtidar is a senior lecturer in politics in the Department of
Political Economy, King’s College, London. She is the author of Secularizing
Islamists? Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamaat-ud-Dawa in Urban Pakistan (2011) and
coeditor (with David Lehmann) of the four-volume Fundamentalisms: Critical
Concepts in Religions. Her website is www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments
/politicaleconomy/People/academic/iqtidar.aspx
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Altenses,5 the subversion of democratic politics that has accompanied it,6 and
the exclusion and poverty that ﬂow from it.7However, a critical aspect that
has remained understudied is the ideational constellation that might sup-
port and embed this liberalization in everyday life, building on existing ideas
and practices such that criticism of neoliberalism is increasingly carried
out within a market paradigm. This reach of neoliberal ideas is not linked
primarily to their logical superiority but is, at least in part, due to their
elision with other preexisting ideas and practices. How precisely ideas
travel andmove into different directions remains a complex phenomenon.
Aspects of the general problem of studying ideational change in the con-
temporary context have bedeviled analysis of neoliberalism.8 Critics of neo-
liberalism have assumed too much coherence and linearity at two levels.
First, the majority of critics have not recognized adequately the variations
within neoliberal thought. An emerging strand of scholarship is beginning
to address that particular gap.9 Second, and more importantly, critics have
not paid much attention to the contradictory political subjectivities pro-
duced by locally mediated, still unfolding versions of neoliberalism. How
are neoliberal ideas embedded in vastly different political contexts? What
particular combinations gain salience in speciﬁc historical-regional conﬁg-
urations? What kind of political actions are made less or more likely? Or
to use William Connolly’s term, what are the distinctive “knots” of neo-5. See Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Per-
spective (London, 2003).
6. For instance, see Atul Kohli, Poverty Amid Plenty in the New India (New York, 2012),
and Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution (New York, 2015).
7. See David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York, 2005), and Joseph
Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York, 2002).
8. See Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (New York,
1996), and Sheri Berman, “The Primacy of Politics versus the Primacy of Economics: Under-
standing the Ideological Dynamics of the Twentieth Century,” Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 3
(2009): 561–78 and “Ideas, Norms, and Culture in Political Analysis,” Comparative Politics 33
(Jan. 2001): 231–50.
9. See Daniel Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of
Neoliberal Politics (Princeton, N.J., 2012), who suggests that there are three distinct phases so
far. The ﬁrst phase (1920s–1950s) was characterized by the work of Frederick Hayek, Ludwig
von Mises, and Karl Popper. During the second phase (1950s–1980s) Milton Friedman gained
prominence and political leaders such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan began to
put neoliberal ideas into practice. Chicago school economists also broke away from the more
nuanced analysis of the earlier generation of neoliberals to present the market both as a
means and an end in itself. The third phase (1980s to the present) saw the roll out of these
policies at a global scale through international agencies and accords such as the IMF, the
World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the North American Free Trade Agreement.
See also The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective, ed.
Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (Cambridge, Mass., 2009).
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Alliberalism with existing traditions of thought and practice in speciﬁc con-
texts?10
In this regard, the role that religious groups may have played in sustain-
ing aspects of neoliberalism is an important one and requires some careful
excavation given the ready association of religion with an abstract moral-
ity.11 In particular, the relationship between neoliberalism and contempo-
rary Islamic thought remains largely unexplored. This is a somewhat puz-
zling lacuna given the not insigniﬁcant academic interest in Islamic thought
in recent decades. Much of this interest has been driven by a desire to un-
derstand the relationship with the West and liberalism speciﬁcally. Heavily
focused on the Middle East12much recent work onmodern Islamic political
thought has usefully corrected the ready association with reaction and of
Islamic practice with violence. An initial interest in interrogating Islamist
thought (associated with those who have the explicit aim of taking over
the state) rather than Islamic thought (associated with those who place
themselves within a wider tradition) has, in recent years, branched out
fruitfully. Here, building on these attempts to move beyond the binary
of Western and Islamic political thought, I propose to explore the mutual
imbrication of Islamic political thought with neoliberalism—a very partic-
ular and speciﬁc form of contemporary liberalism.
It is important to separate out neoliberalism and liberalism, to deﬁne
neoliberalism more concretely. The term is used exclusively by its critics10. William E. Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, American Style (Durham, N.C.,
2008), p. 37.
11. Religious groups appear to have reacted to neoliberalism in complex ways. While
some groups have provided critical challenges to the idea of human life pervaded by a market
mentality, others have appropriated and celebrated it; see Millennial Capitalism and the Cul-
ture of Neoliberalism, ed. Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff (Durham, N.C., 2001); Ruth
Marshall, Political Spiritualities: The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria (Chicago, 2009); and
Salwa Ismail, “Piety, Proﬁt, and the Market in Cairo: A Political Economy of Islamisation,”
Contemporary Islam 7, no. 1 (2013): 107–28. At the same time, large corporations have often
attempted to harness moral discourses produced within various religious traditions to foster
novel work ethics and labor practices in tune with the demands of global markets; see Beth-
any Moreton, To Serve God and Walmart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 2009); Charles Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capital-
ism (New York, 2006); and Daromir Rudnyckyj, Spiritual Economies: Islam, Globalization,
and the Afterlife of Development (Ithaca, N.Y., 2010).
12. See Roxanne L. Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of
Modern Rationalism: A Work of Comparative Political Theory (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Michaelle L.
Browers, Democracy and Civil Society in Arab Political Thought: Transcultural Possibilities,
(Syracuse, N.Y., 2006); and Andrew March, “Taking People as They Are: Islam as a ‘Realistic
Utopia’ in the Political Theory of Sayyid Qutb,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 1
(2010): 189–207. Notable exceptions to this Middle Eastern focus include Qasim Zaman, Mod-
ern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age: Religious Authority and Internal Criticism (New York,
2012), and Faisal Devji, Landscapes of Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity (Ithaca, N.Y., 2005).
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Alnow, and its abandonment by its proponents causes some confusion about
its distinction from liberalism.13 Neoliberalism is broadly identiﬁed with a
set of policies that entail the repudiation of Keynesian economics and the
institutionalization of various free-trade agreements. One of the key as-
pects of neoliberal ideas is the viliﬁcation of the state as a vehicle for social
and individual transformation. The question is not of more or less state—
even though this is how much of the debate has been framed—but of de-
coupling individual transformation from political processes at the level of
political imagination, an attempt at rendering invisible the heavily milita-
rized state that neoliberalism and corporate globalization actually require
to function. Neoliberalism supports the idea of the market as the vehicle
of individual transformation and, indirectly, of social reformation. This
is linked to the second key aspect of neoliberalism that entails a naturali-
zation of inequality, presenting it as a result of individual behaviors and
choices in an economized social life rather than within politico-economic
structures. There is some complexity here to consider because neoliberals
have not shied away from structural reforms, and certainly the World
Bank’s Structural Adjustment Plans have had a dramatic effect. However,
as these reforms have been premised on the philosophy of liberating the
individual to pursue her or his interests in a free market, the most efﬁcient
vehicle of her or his transformation, they privilege the individual and the
market in an unprecedented manner, making the political mechanisms of
structural change disappear. Neoliberalism radically focuses on the indi-
vidual, going beyond the conﬂicted vacillation between the individual and
the community that liberalism entails.14 Liberalism is a more fractured ide-
ology than neoliberalism. Liberal states can be expansive orminimalist; they
can be welfare states as well as highly militarized ones. Neoliberalism takes
away that ambivalence within liberalism to make it much more narrow.
Thus, what deﬁnes neoliberalism and separates it from liberalism is this rad-
ical focus on the individual and the decoupling of political transformation
from individual transformation through an economization of social life.
Economization of social life is a signiﬁcant feature to consider. Wendy
Brown suggests that “neoliberal rationality, while foregrounding the mar-13. In their analysis of 148 journal articles, Taylor C. Boas and Jordon Gans-Morse, “Neo-
liberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan,” Studies in Comparative In-
ternational Development 44 (2009): 137–61, have rightly pointed out that the term is used too
loosely and requires greater deﬁnition if it is to play an analytical role. I am grateful to Sven
Gerst for suggesting this article.
14. See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London, 2013), and
Morton Schoolman, “The Moral Sentiments of Neoliberalism,” Political Theory 15, no. 2
(1987): 205–24.
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Alket, is not only or even primarily focused on the economy; it involves
extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social
actions, even as the market itself remains a distinctive player.”15 Neoliber-
alism is, then, not just about speciﬁc economic policies but about a world-
view, an approach to social and political life. At the very least, neoliberal-
ism is not without a soul, as Bethany Moreton suggests: “To understand
enthusiasm for economic visions that do not pay off, we need to stop imag-
ining Homo economicus at the center of the story. It should be self-evident
that emotional or spiritual interests regularly trumpmaterial ones.”16How
are spiritual and emotional interests so articulated that they resonate with
the Washington Consensus is the question that Moreton explores through
the relationship between Walmart and Christian Evangelicals in the Amer-
ican South. This is a very useful approach, not least because it helps us
think about the contours of moral ideas and neoliberalism in speciﬁc set-
tings. To assume that neoliberalism has had exactly the same trajectory in
every context—something that otherwise excellent critics such as David
Harvey are prone to doing—is to forgo all options for subversion and ne-
gation. While some attention has been paid to the role of the ideas among
policymakers, not enough attention is paid to the changes in the ideational
constellations of those at the receiving end of these policies or to how neo-
liberalismmight fuse with existing ideas and practices in different contexts.
To elaborate this fusion, I turn now to the Tablighi Jamaat and start with a
brief history of the Tablighi Jamaat to elaborate the context and content of
the particular arrangements of ideas that undergird its practices, moving
then to discuss its vision of personal piety that establishes political partic-
ipation as a sullied, divisive activity unrelated to the project of personal
transformation.
Converting Muslims to Islam: Origins of the Tablighi Jamaat
Mass proselytizing had not been a feature of Muslim life prior to the co-
lonial period and the encounter with Christian missionaries. Founded as a
proselytizing organization in 1926 in the outskirts of modern-day Delhi, the
Tablighi Jamaat had remained relatively marginal until the late 1980s. Its
founder, Maulana Ilyas, was perturbed by what he perceived to be an un-
Islamic way of life amongst nominal Muslims in the rural areas surround-
ing Mewat, close to Delhi. With the aim of distancing individuals from the
web of local social inﬂuences that were to him, strikingly anti-Islamic, Ilyas15. Brown, “Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy,” Theory and Event 7, no. 1
(2003): 7.
16. Moreton, “The Soul of Neoliberalism,” Social Text, no. 92 (2007): 106.
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Alencouraged his ﬁrst few followers to go on proselytizing missions, develop
a dramatic distance from the immediate social and political context, and
acquire an otherworldly attitude. He conceived of tabligh (proselytizing)
as a mechanism for strengthening ultimately the belief of the tablighi (the
proselytizer) rather than the converted. The primary aim of TJ members
remains the conversion of their coreligionists, other Muslims, to what they
perceive to be the right kind of Islam. Ilyas also emphasized the importance
of oral transmission in an age when the medium of print was becoming a
key vehicle of religious reform in South Asian religions, including both Is-
lam andHinduism.17TJ was particularly successful among the local traders’
community who helped spread the organization’s reach along their net-
works in Africa and Southeast Asia.18
Some measure of TJ’s modest growth and lack of political attention in
its early years can be made by contrasting it with the inﬂuential Islamist
party Jamaat-e-Islami, founded in 1941, in Lahore. Both organizations had
their origins in a political and cultural milieu of increasingly politicized re-
ligious identities fostered by progressively centralizing colonial control and
a signiﬁcant insecurity experienced by the Muslim elite of North India who
had lostmuch of its power since the fall of theMughal Empire. Indeed, dur-
ing the 1930s Ilyas and the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, Abul A’la Maududi,
had expressed support for each other’s efforts in supporting an Islamic re-
vival.19 However, the Islamist JI became much more prominent in these
early years, in large part due to its interest in political contestation and pub-
lic debate.
This Islamist focus on political contestation meant that even though it
was founded about twenty years after the TJ, much has been written about
JI from the 1960s onwards.20 The TJ only started receiving similar levels of17. See C. A. Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Em-
pire (New York, 2012), and Francis Robinson, “Technology and Religious Change: Islam and
the Impact of Print,” Modern Asian Studies 27, no. 1 (1993): 229–51.
18. See Christian Troll, “Two Conceptions of Da’wá in India: Jamā’at-i Islāmi and
Tablīghī Jamā’at,” Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 39 (July–Sept. 1994): 19.
19. However, despite his praise for Maulana Ilyas in his essay on the TJ, Abul A’la
Maududi is quite clearly thinking of the organizational and political potential of this work
that Ilyas was not interested in developing further; see Abul A’la Maududi, “Aik ahm deeni
tehreek” (1939), in Tablighi Jamaat: Mushahidat aur Tasurat, ed. Shabeer Ahmed Mewati (La-
hore, 2007), pp. 75–87.
20. See Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley, 1961); Islamic Perspec-
tives: Studies in the Honour of Maulānā Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī, ed. Khurshid Ahmed and
Zafar Ishaq Ansari (Leicester, 1979); Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Is-
lamic Revivalism (New York, 1996) and The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-
I-Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley, 1994); Irfan Ahmad, Islamism and Democracy in India: The
Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami (Princeton, N.J., 2009); and Humeira Iqtidar, Secularizing
Islamists? Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamaat-ud-Dawa in Urban Pakistan (Chicago, 2011).
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Alacademic attention from the late 1990s onwards.21 This lack of attention is
driven in part by a level of secrecy that pervades the TJ.Manymembers will
insist that they are not part of an organized entity as such. On being asked
about their afﬁliation, members often reply, at least initially, that they are
working in the path of Allah and not for any organization. The lack of ma-
terial published by the TJ also makes it a difﬁcult entity to study. The or-
ganizational claim “na parcha, na charcha, na kharcha” (no publication,
no publicity, no expenditure) captures the emphasis on oral transmission
that lies at its heart.22 It also necessitates an expanded methodological rep-
ertoire for the study of political imaginaries and intellectual history. I rely
here upon ethnographic research23 supplemented with records of speeches
by some TJ leaders to allow a fuller understanding of the ideas that under-
gird TJ practices. The only text that is used frequently and regularly by the
TJ in South Asia, for proselytizing and training purposes, is the Fazail-e-
Amal (Blessings of [Virtuous] Actions).24 Comprised of ten chapters, it
was written by Maulana Mohammed Zakariya25 (nephew of Maulana
Ilyas)26 in 1938 and is known as the Tablighi nisab or “curriculum.” The
book has been in continuous print since the 1930s, although there are sev-
eral slightly different versions of the book combining Maulana Zakariya’s21. See Barbara Metcalf, “Travelers’ Tales in the Tablighi Jama'at,” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 588 (July 2003): 136–48 and “Living Hadith in the
Tablighi Jamaat,” Journal of Asian Studies 52, no. 3 (1993): 584–608; Farish Noor, Islam on the
Move: The Tablighi Jamaat in Southeast Asia (Amsterdam, 2012); Travellers in Faith: Studies of
the Tablīghī Jamā'at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal, ed. Mohammed
Khalid Masud (Leiden, 2000); Sikand, The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jama'at
(1920–2000); Dietrich Reetz, “Keeping Busy on the Path of Allah: The Self-Organization
(Intizām) of Tablīghī Jamā'at,” in Islam in Contemporary South Asia, ed. Daniela Bredi
(Rome, 2004), pp. 295–305; and Thomas K. Gugler, “The New Religiosity of Tablighi Jama`at
and Da`wat-e Islami and the Transformation of Islam in Europe,” Anthropos 105 (July 2010):
121–36.
22. The organization has no ofﬁcial publications wing, unlike the Islamists. However, cur-
rent or ex-afﬁliates are publishing an increasing number of travel accounts, biographies, and
instructional pamphlets.
23. See Banu Bargu, Starve and Immolate: The Politics of Human Weapons (New York,
2014), and Iqtidar, Secularizing Islamists? for a similar use of ethnography for political theory
and political thought.
24. See Mohammed Zakariya Kandhalwi, Fazail-e-Amal (Lahore, 1996); hereafter abbrevi-
ated FA.
25. Maulana Zakariya was an accomplished scholar who wrote in Arabic and Urdu. While
his lighter writings in the form of the Fazail series are much more popular, his scholarly cre-
dentials rest on a six-volume Arabic commentary on Imam Malik’s Muwatta and Urdu com-
mentary on Imam Tirmizi’s work. He was a proliﬁc writer, trained primarily in the madaris
at Gangoh and Saharanpur under Deobandi inﬂuence, and is the author of more than a hun-
dred books.
26. TJ leadership roles have tended to stay within the extend family. After Maulana Ilyas,
Maulana Yusuf Kandhalwi and then another relative, Maulana Inam-ul-Hassan, have led the
organization.
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Alwritings on the importance of prayers (Fazail-e-Namaz), Ramzan (Fazail-
e-Ramzan), and the Quran (Fazail-e-Quran).
The key aim of the book is to provide qisay—incidents and stories—
from the life of the prophet and his companions to inspire virtuous behav-
ior among the readers. While Maulana Zakariya drew upon his extensive
knowledge of Islamic history and hadith to write this book, he claims he
wrote it while recovering from an illness that prevented him from the rig-
ors of “mental work”: writing his more academic commentaries (FA, p. 8).
The format is simple: a title indicating the key activity in the story (for ex-
ample, “Hazrat Umar’s Migration”), a narrative over two or three para-
graphs, and then the author’s conclusion of the key insights from the qisa.
While the Fazail-e-Amal had wide circulation within TJ circles since the
early 1940s, it only started appearing in mainstream bookshops in Pakistan
in the last two decades. With the rapid rise in TJ membership over the last
three decades27 the Fazail-e-Amal has become much more ubiquitous. This
period also coincided with the entrenchment of neoliberal policies in much
of the world and speciﬁcally, for our purposes here, in Pakistan.28 Since
the late 1970s, the Pakistani state has increasingly operated within what
Michael Sandel has called a “marketmimicking governance,”29 one in which
areas previously considered outside the domain of the market and market
transactions are reorganized within a market framework. While a small
segment of the middle class has moved up, the overall impact has been a
substantial increase in inequality, as well as net poverty. This increase in
inequality and poverty accelerated in the last decade in keeping with global27. Exact ﬁgures are hard to calculate, but from their own accounts TJ had grown from a
few thousand members in the 1970s to between two and three million within Pakistan by the
early 2000s.
28. In Pakistan the initial round of liberalization was introduced in 1978–79 soon after
General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq imposed martial rule over the country. The government de-
nationalized some industry and privatized public sector activities such as education and
health. Critically, it signed up for IMF Trust Fund loans in 1979–80. In 1987–88 the IMF im-
posed a restrictive set of conditions, including limits on budget deﬁcit, extensions of general
sales taxes, and exchange rate reforms. A second intensive round of reforms was introduced
in 1993–94 by an interim government of technocrats and past World Bank employees. This
government agreed to a raft of far-reaching conditions under the rubric of Structural Adjust-
ment Plans, including the reduction of trade tariffs, the reduction of subsidies for agricultural
inputs such as fertilizers, and the extension of a tax net to include almost all the items on
the list of “tax free” goods and further excise duties on utilities. See Shahrukh Raﬁ Khan and
Saﬁya Aftab, “Structural Adjustment, Labour, and the Poor in Pakistan,” research report
for the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (1995), www.sdpi.org/publications/ﬁles/R8
-Structural%20Adjustment,%20Labour.pdf. Pervez Musharraf’s regime (1997–2008) as well as
subsequent democratic governments have further entrenched these policies.
29. Michael J. Sandel, BBC Rieth Lectures, 2009, downloads.bbc.co.uk/rmhttp/radio4
/transcripts/20090630_reith_anewpolitics.rtf. See also his What Money Can't Buy: The Moral
Limits of Markets (New York, 2012) for more detailed treatment of markets and governance.
This content downloaded from 137.073.126.216 on July 12, 2017 08:46:48 AM
l use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Critical Inquiry / Summer 2017 799
Altrends. In 1992 26 percent of the Pakistani population lived below the pov-
erty line, but by 2007 the ﬁgure had risen to 44 percent.30
The concurrent rise of the neoliberal state in Pakistan and of TJ cannot
be seen to imply a straightforward causal relationship, but the correlation
does require some investigation. While the TJ had originated earlier than
neoliberalism, they seem to have developed a symbiotic relationship that
inﬂuential work on Muslim piety does not explore or recognize.31 Unlike
the mosque movement that Saba Mahmood has studied, and the ulema
(scholars) that Muhammad Qasim Zaman has focused on, TJ members
do not engage in any signiﬁcant manner with Quranic exegisis.32 Meetings
are spent primarily discussing karguzari (the experience of proselytizing).
Karguzari accounts follow a formulaic pattern of seemingly insurmount-
able difﬁculties, their resolution through divine intervention, and the im-
mense emotional and spiritual gains felt by the narrator. Similarly, while
there is a veneration of the knowledge and wisdom of ulema within the
TJ, there is very little direct engagement or understanding of the debates
they conduct. Not just the organizational form of Tablighi Jamaat with
its emphasis on mass proselytizing and simpliﬁed oral transmission but
more importantly its radical distancing from sociopolitical struggles trans-
form the implications of piety.
Piety against Politics
A key feature of modernity in predominantly Muslim polities has been
the increase in the variety of options for leading the life of a good Muslim.
The multiplicity of options in how to be a good Muslim is often bewilder-
ing and a cause of much heated debate.33 Within this deeply contested ter-
rain, the TJ comes under frequent attack by other revivalists, particularly
the Islamists, for turning its members explicitly away from engagement30. In 2008 the government of Pakistan changed its accounting mechanisms and miracu-
lously lifted several million people out of poverty. According to the new metrics, close to
30 percent of the population was living under the poverty line in 2013; see World Bank, “Pa-
kistan,” data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan. See Ghulam Mohammed Arif and Shujaat
Farooq, Poverty, Inequality, and Unemployment in Pakistan, www.isdb.org/irj/go/km/docs
/documents/IDBDevelopments/Internet/English/IDB/CM/Publications/Parnership_Strategies
/Pakistan_MCPS_Background.pdf, p. 3.
31. See Saba Mahmood, The Politics of Piety: Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject
(Princeton, N.J., 2005), and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Cus-
todians of Change (Princeton, N.J., 2002).
32. Zaman, Ulama in Contemporary Islam, p. 185, notes the close contact that TJ leader-
ship maintains with Deobandi ulama and the respect for the tradition as mediated by them.
While this respect is transmitted to the lay preachers who form the mass of the TJ, the con-
tent of their debates are not.
33. Iqtidar, Secularizing Islamists? pp. 98–129, discusses some implications of this competi-
tion among contending ways of being a good Muslim.
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Alwith questions of power, political decision making, and legitimacy of po-
litical leadership.
The differences in political imaginaries bound up with these two very
different Islamic revivalist movements was made explicit to me during
ﬁeldwork in Lahore through interaction with two brothers who lived in ad-
joining houses in a lower-middle-class neighborhood. Asmentioned earlier,
Abdul Basit and Abdul Baqir were afﬁliated with two very different orga-
nizations. Every evening for the last ﬁfteen years, Abdul Baqir has been go-
ing out for tabligh (proselytizing), dividing his week into days spent in his
own neighborhood, adjacent neighborhoods, and at the Raiwind national
markaz (center). Running a shop with his brother allowed him much ﬂex-
ibility in taking off for these long tabligh trips. His brother, Abdul Basit,
was equally committed to an Islamist party, participating in political cam-
paigns and electoral canvassing for the Jamaat-e-Islami. He found his
brother’s lack of commitment to political change deeply problematic and
did not let any opportunity go without chiding him for taking the “easier”
path: the path of depoliticized religiosity and of an individualized focus. In
response Abdul Baqir never engaged in debate with his brother.
One area of immediate and everyday concern and of debate during my
ﬁeldwork was the lack of energy—more speciﬁcally the lack of electricity
and gas—in their neighborhood. The differences in how the two brothers
approached the issue is a stark reminder of two different imaginaries. Abdul
Basit would blame the lack of electricity on the government—the corruption
of the political parties, the bureaucracy, and of speciﬁc politicians. How-
ever, he contended that behind all of them were the International Moner-
tary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, forcing Pakistanis to take on energy
producing arrangements that plainly were not working. He hashed out the
details of these arrangements in many different ways depending upon the
listeners and the setting. Sometimes he discussed kickbacks to speciﬁc pol-
iticians; at others he would focus on the ways the IMF and theWorld Bank
“blackmail Pakistani politicians through the threat of US power”; and of-
ten he derided the incompetence of the Pakistani elite.
Abdul Basit’s analysis may be lacking in speciﬁcs, but it did identify crit-
ical areas of concern in Pakistan’s energy policy. Salman Khalid and Kamal
Munir have pointed out that “the blackout in Pakistan is a policy failure, a
result of the disastrous privatisation undertaken by the government at the
behest of the World Bank.”34 The privatization of electricity generation
under the 1994 power policy was based on the structure developed for the34. Salman Khalid and Kamal Munir, “Pakistan’s Power Politics,” Economic and Political
Weekly 47 (June 2012): 27.
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AlHub Power Project, a 1,292 megawatt, 1.6 billion dollar project that was cele-
brated widely amongst global investors, ﬁrst as the deal of the year and then
the deal of the decade, and long supported by theWorld Bank. This energy
policy was commended by then-US Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary as
a model of energy privatization. She travelled to Pakistan with eighty Amer-
ican businessmen primarily from the energy sector, and the state visit resulted
in sixteen contracts worth nearly four billion dollars.35 One of the key fea-
tures of this policy is that it has entailed contracts that oblige the Pakistani
government to not just buy electricity at a much higher rate from the In-
dependent Power Producers (IPP) set up as a result of these contracts but,
more damagingly, pay the IPPs even when no electricity is being produced.
The costs associated with the policy have been passed on to consumers, who
are now paying close to 530 percent more in rupees since the 1990s in ad-
dition to suffering through daily electricity outages for several hours.
During conversations about the energy crisis in the country and its im-
pact on daily life in the neighborhood—children unable to concentrate at
school due to interrupted sleep, employees absent and late, exacerbated
health problems and anxiety levels, extra expenditures to organize private
alternatives such as generators and Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS)
units, and so on—Abdul Baqir would sit silently and offered neither an al-
ternative explanation nor an afﬁrmation of any argument. He was careful
to let the listeners know that he did not think these were important matters
but also that he was too polite to say this outright. His resolutely distant
stance would anger Abdul Basit, whowould often recount how in his youth
Abdul Baqir too had been “an aware” and political person but now had de-
cided to pursue only his own salvation rather than working towards a col-
lective one. However, at some point in such conversations Abdul Basit
would often extol the value of having good Muslims as leaders. If the pol-
iticians had been “good Muslims,” he would argue, they would not have
been as easy to blackmail or bribe. This was the only point that both broth-
ers seemed to agree upon. Yet the role imagined for the goodMuslim ruler
was different for both.
The debate about the value of rule by good men versus governance
through well-designed laws continues to be an important one in many
non-Western contexts.36Both TJ and JI value personal piety as a key quality35. See ibid, p. 25.
36. See Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939 (Cambridge, 1983),
pp. 161–93; Wael B. Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity's Moral Predicament
(New York, 2013), pp. 48–60; and Leigh K. Jenco, “ ‘Rule by Man’ and ‘Rule by Law’ in Early
Republican China: Contributions to a Theoretical Debate,” Journal of Asian Studies 69, no. 1
(2010): 181–203.
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Alin rulers, but while JI explicitly values organizational capabilities and policy
analysis as well as having a structured procedure to choose such a leader,
the TJ does not concern itself with thinking through the form and content
of political leadership.37 It is perhaps no coincidence that the position of
the amir of JI, its highest ofﬁce, has been held by men from a range of eth-
nic backgrounds, while the TJ leadership remains concentrated largely
within the family of Maulana Ilyas.
The TJ is not alone in valuing piety as the most important qualiﬁcation
for a ruler, or ruling class, but its description of a virtuous leader remains
sparse. In the Fazail-e-Amal the section that has any direct bearing on the
conduct of rulers is chapter 4, titled “The Piety of the Companions” (Sa-
haba Ka Taqwa). This chapter provides neither an exhaustive list of attri-
butes for the good ruler nor any guidelines for what just rule might mean,
but it does provide a strong indication of the sensibility that should guide
all in positions of power. It comprises ten incidents in which the Prophet
Muhammad and some of his companions agonize over their responsibility
to halal (permissible) consumption and earning. A key obligation for all
Muslims is to earn a halal living, that is, one that is not contaminated by
wrongdoing and ill-intention.
One potent example from the book that was also used in several dars
meetings that I attended is about the honesty of Hazrat Umar (the second
caliph) while in ofﬁce (634–44 CE). Hazrat Umar received an ofﬁcial con-
signment of musk from Bahrain. His wife offered to measure it out for dis-
tribution. Umar did not respond. The issue came up again, and she offered
once again, and again he did not respond. The third time she raised it he
said, “I don’t want that you should hold the musk and put it on the scales,
and then rub these hands over your self. Even this would be more than our
share” (FA, p. 61). The caliph did not raise questions about propriety, pro-
cedures, or legal injunctions. His concern was about an inadvertent gain
and his wife’s niyyat (intention) in performing an act of public service.
Maulana Zakariya provides either very brief commentaries after each
narrative or none at all, holding the narratives to be self-explanatory. After
recounting the incident about Umar he points out that “this is the level of
caution (ehtiyat) that these companions and submitters to Allah exercized”
(FA, p. 61). Here Maualana Zakariya’s writing is emblematic of the TJ ap-37. After Maududi’s death in 1979, the JI started practicing more thoroughly the mecha-
nisms he had envisioned for meritocratic leadership. In keeping with JI’s Leninist-inspired
structure, leaders are selected from amongst the existing members of the central committee
or shura through voting by the members. Notwithstanding its failures in other spheres, JI is
today the most internally democratic national political party in the country, with leadership
drawn primarily from the middle to lower middle class.
This content downloaded from 137.073.126.216 on July 12, 2017 08:46:48 AM
l use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Critical Inquiry / Summer 2017 803
Alproach. The writing is simple and direct. Rather than presenting a detailed
argument, he makes the point through the use of examples from the lives
of the Prophet and his companions who represent the best form of Islamic
virtue. This is complemented with evocative language and rhetorical asser-
tions. Those who submit their will to perfecting virtuous behavior are con-
stantly at tenterhooks, in continuous doubt about whether they have done
enough. They scrutinize their own intentions mercilessly and do not as-
sume any ofﬁce, any beneﬁt without questioning their own motives. Mau-
alana Zakariya’s intention is to portray this doubt and this desire to con-
stantly challenge oneself, not to explain why this is important. He wants
to inculcate a sensibility rather than win an argument, and to that extent
the choice of simple narratives and real-life examples is entirely apposite.
Ulema (religious scholars) have long debated the characteristics of just
political leaders and built upon the experiences of the early Islamic state as
well as the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs to provide depth through exam-
ples.38 However, in some contrast to the TJ, many ulema saw and continue
to believe that their responsibility is to bind political action to the founda-
tional texts in a way that would limit the capriciousness of misguided rul-
ers.39 The TJ thus carries forward an important strand in Islamic political
thought: identifying piety as a key attribute of the just ruler, but in a par-
ticularly denuded manner, the TJ does not recognize the completely trans-
formed context that the introduction of the modern state with its new
forms of power ushered in.
The debates about the piety of rulers in Islamic political thought have
depended heavily on what Wael Hallaq has called “paradigmatic” Islamic
governance: one that is infused by sharia not just as a set of guidelines for
legal decisions but as a moral force that shaped social, political, and eco-
nomic relations.40 This moral force rests on the belief that if God prefers
one member of the community over another, it has to be by virtue of
the quality of his or her taqwa (piety; respect for Allah) rather than class
or race. The quality of a leader’s taqwa would reﬂect itself in his or her ac-
tions over the long term. A pious leader would try his or her best to be just
to all subjects. If at times the ruler undertook seemingly unjust actions, it
was important to consider the niyyat (intention) behind these actions.41
Ultimately, the task of the ulema and the subjects of the state under the ruler38. See Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge, 2001).
39. See Zaman, Ulama in Contemporary Islam.
40. Hallaq, The Impossible State, p. 8.
41. For some of these debates, see Muzaffar Alam, The Languages of Political Islam: India
1200–1800 (Chicago, 2004), pp. 27–44.
This content downloaded from 137.073.126.216 on July 12, 2017 08:46:48 AM
l use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
804 Humeira Iqtidar / Neoliberalism and Islamic Piety
Alwas made easy by the overarching moral obligations within which society
functioned.
Hallaq places this paradigmatic state in direct contradiction with the
modern state.42 It is, indeed, an intractable problem: how to infuse themod-
ern state—with its reliance on legalistic procedures and discursive division
of aspects of human life into religious, political, and economic spheres—with
an Islamic sensibility that is not dependent upon laws and does not recog-
nize such a separation? This is the challenge that Muslim revivalists and
reformers have been wrestling with since the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. In the particular case of South Asia, the twin introduc-
tion of the modern state and colonialism that led to the intensive regula-
tion of individual selves, a new imaginary of community in terms of num-
bers rather than the strength of the social bond, and increased legalization
of social interaction43 led to a complete transformation of the mechanisms
and institutions through which power is exercized, impacting South Asians
across religious boundaries.
Operating within its framework of personalized piety alone the TJ does
not explicitly recognize this changed political context of the modern state
while the Islamists do. The Islamists, such as Jamaat-e-Islami, focused on
the state as the vehicle of progress and transformation of the society in
keeping with the dominant trends in global political imagination at the
time. This is important to recognize, not just because more than a theolog-
ical impetus drives Islamist politics,44 but also because we must engage
meaningfully with the political and intellectual context that created the
conditions for the innovation in Islamic political thought that was Islam-
ism. Founded in the late 1940s when the state was the dominant political
idea in the global political imagination—political mobilizations from fas-
cism to liberal nationalism, communism to socialism focused on taking
over the state to transform society—the Islamists such as JI also framed
their movements around the state45 and continue to wrestle, albeit with42. See Hallaq, The Impossible State.
43. Nationalism, religious or secular, as well as democratic politics are dependent upon
this new imaginary, particularly on the quantiﬁed notion of a community that allows the cal-
culation of a majority or minority. See Sudipta Kaviraj, “On Thick and Thin Religion: Some
Reﬂections on Secularization Theory,” in Religion and the Political Imagination, ed. Ira
Katznelson and Gareth Stedman Jones (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 314–36; Arjun Appadurai,
Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger (Durham, N.C., 2006); and David
Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (Berkeley, 1988).
44. The need for this move beyond theology without doing away with the power of ideas
embedded in a tradition has been shown most persuasively by Talal Asad, Formation of the Sec-
ular: Christianity, Islam, and Modernity (Stanford, Calif., 2003), and Euben, Enemy in the Mirror.
45. See Iqtidar, “Colonial Secularism and the Genesis of Islamism in North India,” in Re-
ligion and the Political Imagination, pp. 235–53.
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Alvarying levels of success, with the question of state power and an Islamic
society.46
Naturalizing Inequality
The TJ, founded only twenty years earlier than the JI, had chosen to ig-
nore the growing importance of the idea of the state and quite explicitly
refused to engage with questions of power in society. Given its emphasis
on oral transmission, simplicity, and mass reach, and without the possibil-
ity of in-depth engagement with the wider historical and juridical context
in which these ideas could ensure just rule, the TJ popularizes a view of
leadership that has no engagement with the political and social dilemmas
of contemporary life nor with the transformed context of themodern state.
Contemporary political leadership is presented as that which is invariably
corrupt and corruptible,47 a result of personal corruption rather than pol-
icy failures. Thus, TJ continues to encourage high-proﬁle individuals such
as former presidents of Pakistan, high-ranking ofﬁcials and bureaucrats,
famous cricketers, and TV personalities to join. In fact, the number of high-
ranking army ofﬁcials, including serving generals and commanding ofﬁcers
who are members of the TJ, has steadily increased through the 1980s and
has been a source of signiﬁcant pride for the organization.48 The Islamist
JI on the other hand cannot boast of such an illustrious membership.
Some join the TJ because they are disillusioned with themore aggressive
politicization of religiosity by the Islamists, particularly on college and uni-
versity campuses in Pakistan. Often they cite disillusionment with state-
oriented politics more broadly and with the JI speciﬁcally. The question
is, of course, not whether this represents a depoliticization as some have
argued,49 but what the precise contours of politics are imagined to be. In
contrast to the Islamists such as JI, the TJ shies away from any direct anal-
ysis of power and its manifestations in the context in which it operates.
Within the TJ, then, even as the ultimate goal of a state led by pious Mus-
lims is not renounced, there is no attention paid to the sources, uses, and46. The emerging primacy of the market in the global political imagination has led to
some changes in Islamist imagination as well; see Iqtidar, “Secularism beyond the State: The
‘State’ and the ‘Market’ in Islamist Imagination,” Modern Asian Studies 45, no. 3 (2011): 535–64.
47. See Mufti Roshan Shah Qasmi, Hazrat Ji Kay Bayanat Ka Majmu'a (Lahore, n.d.),
esp. pp. 28–31, and anon., Hazratji kay Safr-e-Pakistan kay Aakhri Bayanat (Lahore, 2009),
pp. 60–73.
48. See Shabir Ahmed Khan Mewati, Tablighi Jamaat: Mushahidat-o-Tasurat (Lahore,
2007), pp. 190–91, 232–33.
49. While most scholars have argued that it does represent depoliticization, a few, such as
Sikand, The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jam'aat (1920–2000), have suggested that
even though the TJ is apolitical the process of foregrounding an Islamic identity is likely to
have long-term political implications.
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Almanifestations of political power or the inequality that might ﬂow from its
concentration among a few.
TJ members are socialized to never engage in political debate partly so
they are agreeable to those they are seeking to convert to their version of
Islam (see FA, pp. 301–15).50 However, this very manner of relating to
others requires a radical reconceptualizing of the economic divisions and
political polarization that exists in contemporary Pakistan. Inequality has
risen sharply in Pakistan over the last three decades, and members of the
TJ are conspicuous in their attempts to disengage with everyday conversa-
tions about inequality, unemployment, inﬂation, and normative state pol-
icies. The conception of society as an organic whole is an important and
long-standing aspect of TJ ideology and again one with strong roots in Is-
lamic political thought. The TJ braids this idea with an imagination of so-
ciety where divisions are necessary and natural. Arguing resourcefully to
negate leftist notions of contradiction and class that pervaded the urban
cultural mileu in Pakistan during themid 1960s, Maulana Yusuf Kandhalwi
(son of Ilyas and leader of TJ after his death), declared, in a visit to Pakistan
from India in 1965, that
Just as god (khuda) has made man a complex of contradictions so
too are human classes (tabqat) a collection of contradictions. The
job of the Tongue is to speak, the rest of human body’s job is to
not speak. To speak or not to speak are the opposites of each other.
The Brain has to think, the rest of the body to not think. They are
also in contradiction with each other. . . . In the same way the Su-
preme Truth has made human beings into different classes. Not one
but very different classes. If they work together then rich, poor, local
and foreign, ruler and ruled, child and parents all come together
like a body and even if they have very little of the world’s goods
they are successful. If they are not together then however much cap-
ital (sarmaya) they have, they are unsuccessful.51
Kandhalwi’s reference to contradictions, capital and class divisions, and
foreign and local rule is quite clearly picking up on the themes of leftist de-
bates that had caught the imagination of postcolonial urban Pakistan in the
1960s as a result of the Chinese revolution, but he presents a very different
resolution to this contradiction in direct opposition to the Marxist idea of
their inherent irreconcilability. The cultural and political impact of Left
mobilizations in Pakistan has been widely underestimated; Pakistan’s Is-50. See also Maulana Akram Ullah Jan Qasmi, Da'ai ka Tosha (Lahore, n.d.), pp. 39–41.
51. Quoted in anon., Hazrat Ji Kay Safr-e-Pakistan Kay Akhri Bayanat, p. 22.
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Allamist present casts too dark a shadow on its other histories, making pos-
sible contemporary assertions about the inevitability of religious violence
for a state founded on religious nationalism. However, other histories and
futures did exist. Of these, a vibrant Left presence in the cultural politics
of urban Pakistan is beginning to receive academic attention.52 Kandhalwi,
in opposing leftist arguments, insisted on viewing society as an organic
whole in a faithful rendition of the traditionalist perspective but without
the creative engagement with the transformations in society that are the
hallmark of many other Islamic and Islamist thinkers.53 In the same speech
Kandhalwi went on to say,
Whatever the rich man has, the poor man should not steal it, or
question it, or embezzle it. In fact, the poor should not even think
that perhaps the rich will give something without asking. If the rich
man wants to bestow a favour upon the poor man, he should reject
it saying that the Prophet (Muhammad) was also a poor man. This
is the Islam of the poor man. . . . Similarly for those who have
wealth, Islam requires them to focus their effort on the poor and
try to help their salvation. Point out the path to them.54
A strong tradition of Islamic thought and practice stands on the foun-
dations of the widely shared belief that in the eyes of Allah all are poor.55 It
has been argued that “the poor [are] at the heart of [Islam’s] economic uni-
verse.”56 Unlike the divide between deserving and undeserving poor that
developed in modern Christian thought, there is no such classiﬁcation
of the poor in Islamic thought, although there are speciﬁc categories of
people identiﬁed as deserving of unstinting charity in the form of waqf (in-
stitutionalized charity through property), zakat (obligatory alms), and
sadqa (voluntary almsgiving). Keeping this complexity inmind, it becomes
all the more critical to recognize the relatively fragmented nature of the vi-
sion of personal piety being propogated by the TJ, limited as it is by its aim
of mass proselytizing by simplifying ideas and practices and its organiza-
tional architecture of lay preachers. In premodern Islamic society, which52. See Kamran Asdar Ali, Communism in Pakistan: Politics and Class Activism 1947–1972
(New York, 2015).
53. In contrast, Iranian Islamist Ali Shariati and Pakistani scholar Khurram Ja Murad had
already started engaging productively with the leftist critique.
54. Quoted in anon., Hazratjij: Kay Safr-e-Pakistan Kay Akhri Bayanat, p. 23.
55. See Surah Muhammad 47:38: “Here you are—those invited to spend in the cause of
Allah—but among you are those who withhold [out of greed]. And whoever withholds only
withholds [beneﬁt] from himself; and Allah is the free of need, while you are the needy.”
56. Michael Bonner, “Poverty and Economics in the Quran,” Journal of Interdisciplinary
History 35 (Winter 2005): 406.
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Alwas “permeated by the political concept of moral accountability,” a reli-
ance on communal piety, a paradigmatic morality, to limit inequality or
at least its worst social implications was perhaps a feasible option and,
as Hallaq claims, may have resulted, on the whole, in much more egalitar-
ian societies than European ones in similar historical periods.57
In medieval and early modern contexts, all three Abrahamic faiths were
combined in understanding poverty as something that cannot be eradi-
cated and that giving to the needy was an act of piety, not of social trans-
formation.58 In the modern period, this changed dramatically. The belief
that poverty and the inequality it represents can and should be eliminated
or, at least, reduced to as low a level as possible, became widespread. From
the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the state as a very speciﬁc conﬁgura-
tion of power, a collection of interests and institutions, increasingly took
on the job of addressing questions of poverty with varying levels of success.
In the process, all states acquired methods and techniques to increasingly
manage individuals as well as communities, although of course the Foucaul-
dian state had different levels of penetration in different parts of the world.
In South Asia, too, while institutions of incarceration and education were
not as streamlined as the French state that Foucault writes about,59 never-
theless a fundamental transformation in the relationship of the individual
with the state did begin in the early nineteenth century and accelerated in
the late colonial and early postcolonial period under the rubric of develop-
mentalism and poverty eradication. It is this powerful new entity, the state,
which TJ chooses to not understand. More critically, in a context where
the paradigmatic notion of moral accountability pervading all social, polit-
ical, and economic interaction cannot be assumed to remain untarnished by
the break in tradition brought about by the colonial encounter,60 a view of
society as an organic whole seems incomplete at best. Nevertheless, this dis-
tance from the state, from political projects demanding accountability, and
the view of an unequal but organic society as the natural order of things
found particular favor in neoliberal times. Pakistan’s neoliberal govern-
ments have given relatively free reign to TJ to grow, hold public meetings,
and access those in public ofﬁce even when Islamists were under scrutiny;
the TJ has tutored large segments of society to believe that engaging in po-
litical mobilization is a distraction for good Muslims.57. Hallaq, The Impossible State, p. 69.
58. See Mark Cohen, “Poverty and Charity in Past Times,” Journal of Interdisciplinary His-
tory 35, no. 3 (2005): 347–60.
59. See Rosalind O’Hanlon and David Washbrook, “After Orientalism: Culture, Criticism,
and Politics in the Third World,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 34, no. 1 (Jan.
1992): 141–67.
60. See Asad, Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (Ithaca, N.Y., 1973).
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AlTime as Effort
Tablighi Jamaat reﬂects just one conﬁguration in the rich Islamic tradi-
tion of thinking about the relationship between the individual and political
power. This link with Islam also constrains Tablighi Jamaat’s symbiosis
with neoliberalism in important ways. In particular, TJ’s disregard for
power and its manifestations in this world, driven as it was by Maulana
Ilyas’s initial interest in distancing his followers from their immediate so-
cial and political struggles, has been sustained by a conception of time that
limits the urgency of neoliberal self-making.
Most TJ dars and karguzarimeetings start with the reminder that “time
is the only capital (sarmya) we have for reaping proﬁts in the afterlife.”
Notwithstanding the language of trade and accounting that is a distinctive
feature of the TJ discourse compared again to the Islamists in particular,61
this conception of time is not entirely amenable to neoliberal thinking. In-
dividual intellectual ability, physical prowess, material wealth, or superior
birth are all rendered equally secondary to the decision to spend time on
the path of tabligh in deﬁning a worthwhile life. Time spent in tabligh is
calledmehnat within the TJ. In literal terms the Urdu wordmehnatmeans
effort or hard work, but in collapsing time and effort together the TJ has
transformed time from a means for ordering events to deﬁning the event.
Thus the only meaningful hours, days, and months are those spent in
tabligh activities. How to scale up the time spent is quite clearly deﬁned.
The minimum asked of every follower is clear: to proselytize at least two
hours every day at home and in the neighborhood, three days every month
in other neighborhoods or localities, and forty days every year potentially
in a different province/country.62 While there is no upper limit, this redef-
inition of time as effort motivates the more committed to take out more
and more time for tabligh. Abdul Baqir, the brother who had chosen TJ,
once explained why he felt compelled to go out every evening despite his
family’s initial protests to spend more time at home: “How long is life? I
can’t know, but I think of it as the mehnat I can undertake. . . . After all,
how long is life? Sixty years? Eighty years? A maximum of one hundred?
And what is that compared to the life we will have after this one? We can’t
even imagine how long that life will be. Time will have no meaning then,
but it has meaning now.”61. For a movement that has only limited engagement with print culture TJ is distinctive
also for publishing a slim book extolling the value of trade; see Maulana Zakariya Kandhalwi,
Fazaail-e-Tijarat (Lahore, 1979).
62. See Ahmad Ali Bashami, Dawat-e-Allah aur Tablighi Ehbab Kay Liyay Rehnama Asool:
Tamam Muzakaray (Lahore, n.d.), pp. 7–13, and Qasmi, Da'ai ka Tosha.
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AlThe notion that time will have nomeaning in the afterlife actually trans-
forms the meaning of time in this life.63 The realization that time only has
value during this life when it can actually be converted into effort carries
two important implications. First, as discussed above, it changes the deﬁ-
nition of time and equates it with effort on the path of tabligh. Second, it
transforms the measurement of time such that it is not the coming week
or the next decade but the afterlife that calibrates the scales. With the af-
terlife constantly on the horizon, many other deadlines and pressures lose
their urgency. What remains instead is a curious blend of a much longer
time frame for reaping the rewards of one’s efforts—there may be no im-
mediate results—and a sense of urgency regarding the importance of con-
tinuing efforts.
For TJ members this means that the unit of analysis is no longer an
hour, a day, or a year; rather it is the number of persons converted. The
TJ claims to be transforming Muslim lives one by one. In this it has been
more successful than the modesty of this dictum would suggest; as men-
tioned above, estimates of its members range from ﬁfteen to eighty million
in 150 countries. The disdain towards this worldly time may be a crucial
ingredient in its success, allowing as it does TJ members signiﬁcant free-
dom in redesigning their lives, inculcating a disdain towards the entangle-
ments of this life whether in collective political struggles, in consumerism,64
or in a wholehearted support for the market. This is quite important be-
cause even though the TJ does provide more explicit support for trade gen-
erally, this conception of time limits the scope of economizing social life
that is vital to neoliberalism. The TJ’s emphasis on devaluing engagement
with the subject’s immediate political and social context and naturalizing
existing inequalities to shift the focus away from collective endeavors has
come together with neoliberalism to strengthen it but also presents an im-
portant limitation to urgent endorsement of it.
Conclusion
TJ, like neoliberalism, is a product of what has been called the liberal
age.65 Like neoliberalism, TJ and the political ideas it supports have been63. It also transforms the difference between human history and natural history that
Dipesh Chakrabarty has discussed productively in “The Climate of History: Four Theses,”
Critical Inquiry 35 (Winter 2009): 197–222.
64. Some scholars have noted the turn away from consumerism among TJ members; see
Metcalf, “Living Hadith in the Tablighi Jamaat,” and the essays in Travellers in Faith.
65. Liberalism is not just Western even as it contains an indelible imprint of European
history. Its life in other parts of the world, no doubt mediated through colonialism, is as au-
thentic as in Europe. For liberalism in Arabic thought, see Hourani, Arabic Thought in the
Liberal Age, 1798–1939, and in South Asian thought, see Bayly, Recovering Liberties.
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Alproduced by a broader liberal framework even if both will curtail liberal-
ism dramatically. The synergetic relationship between neoliberalism and
TJ was not entirely predictable but is nevertheless signiﬁcant. Because Ilyas
believed that illiterate Muslims in Mewat needed a complete overhaul of
social norms in the face of competing proselytizers, TJ isolated individuals
from their given social structures and relied upon trade networks for
growth. This attempt at reviving a sense of individualized piety embedded
within existing traditions of Islamic thought and practice reﬂected Ilyas’s
own devotion to particular strands of this tradition. As I have argued above,
this was an attempt at reviving the tradition without working through the
precise nature of power dynamics in the late colonial period and through
the cold war, and one that ﬂourished dramatically with neoliberalismwhen
delinking individual transformation from political engagement became
the dominant ideational frame. My intention here is not to suggest that
all attempts at reviving the traditional norms of piety are problematic or
doomed to elision within neoliberalism. Rather, it is to suggest that the
unique organizational and ideational architecture of the TJ has since the
1980s resulted in a closer imbrication of mass Islamic piety with neoliber-
alism than would have been possible otherwise. TJ has advocated a vision
of individualized piety that does not engage with modern mechanisms of
power, naturalizes inequality, and disdains political mobilization; neolib-
eral governments from Pakistan to UK have preferred TJ to the trouble-
some Islamists—the vast majority of whom are notmilitant, although con-
tentious—and facilitated its ﬂourishing.
This imbrication is not seamless. The broader and widely familiar tra-
dition of Islamic piety does not allow a complete fusion of key ideas and
practices to neoliberalism. A conception of time orthogonal to the neolib-
eral insistence on the economizing of social life is an important difference.
Moreover, the task of building a new community of believers places some
social limits upon the individual. From the development of Wahabism in
late eighteenth-century Arabia to Shah Wali Ullah’s revolution during the
early part of the same century in South Asia there has been a discernable,
although nonlinear, trend towards a redeﬁnition of the relationship be-
tween the individual and the community in Muslim polities.66 TJ makes
a signiﬁcant contribution to an unprecedented entrenchment of individu-
alization within this context but with an inﬂection of ascetism borne out of
a sense of urgency to prepare for the next life and a commitment to a new
community of believers that does not sit comfortably with the neoliberal66. See Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, and Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and
the Community in South Asian Islam since 1850 (London, 2000).
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Alprimacy of the market in the political imagination. Understanding these
points of elision and tension allows us to glimpse the political norms being
crystallized in the contemporary Muslim world by the combined effect of
neoliberalism and mass pietism. In contemporary South Asia, TJ and neo-
liberalism are knotted together by an emphasis on individual transforma-
tion (while inequality is unquestioned) by a notion of the polity infused with
spirituality (while mechanisms for ensuring accountability remain under-
examined) and by a radically free individual uninhibited by existing social
obligations but bound nevertheless by some nebulous commitment to
transforming other individuals. This quieter and quietist strand of con-
temporary Islamic thought is imbricated in transforming not just Islamic
practice but also global political norms.This content downloaded from 137.073.126.216 on July 12, 2017 08:46:48 AM
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